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Water management for irrigation, crop yield and social attitudes: a socio-agricultural 
agent-based model to explore a collective action problem
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aDepartment of Crop Production Ecology, Swedish University of Agricultural Sciences (SLU), Uppsala, Sweden; bDepartment of Earth Science, Uppsala 
University, Uppsala, Sweden; cCentre of Natural Hazards and Disaster Sciences (CNDS), Sweden
ABSTRACT
When rainfall does not meet crop water requirements, supplemental irrigation is needed to maintain 
productivity. On-farm ponds can prevent excessive groundwater exploitation – to the benefit of the 
whole community – but they reduce the cultivated area and require investments by each farmer. Thus, 
choosing the source of water for irrigation (groundwater vs on-farm pond) is a problem of collective 
action. An agent-based model is developed to simulate a smallholder farming system; the farmers’ long-/ 
short-view orientation determines the choice of the water source. We identify the most beneficial water 
source for economic gain and its stability, and how it can change across communities and under future 
climate scenarios. By using on-farm ponds, long-view-oriented farmers provide collective advantages but 
have individual advantages only under extreme climates; a tragedy of the commons is always possible. 
Changes in farmers’ attitudes (and hence sources of water) based on previous experiences can worsen 
the economic outcome.
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1 Introduction
In many regions, rainfall does not reliably meet crop water 
requirements – a condition that could be exacerbated by cli-
mate change (IPCC 2014). Farmers are faced with the chal-
lenge of maintaining and possibly increasing agricultural 
production under water scarcity. The risk of failing this chal-
lenge is high, not only due to current and future climatic 
conditions but also as the result of human response, which 
can be inefficient or consist of short-term solutions that can 
backfire in the long run (e.g. Kahneman 2011, Schill et al. 
2019). For instance, the need for supplemental irrigation has 
already led to groundwater over-exploitation in many regions, 
resulting in a decline of water tables (El-Naqa et al. 2007, 
Scanlon et al. 2012, Wada et al. 2012). In some cases, what 
appears the most appropriate solution is not applied due to 
other factors (e.g. Bussmann et al. 2016), thus calling for the 
implementation of specific policies and incentives. This situa-
tion can trigger a vicious circle of ecological fragility-economic 
poverty (Cheng et al. 2019). Towards a more sustainable and 
climate-resilient agriculture, we thus need to explore the impli-
cations of different management choices for crop production, 
resource use, and economic viability, explicitly including the 
human dimension of decision-making under uncertainty.
Models provide a powerful tool to investigate the interactions 
between environmental conditions and human response to them. 
To be effective, modelling approaches need to explicitly combine 
environmental dynamics with human behaviour. One of the most 
common approaches to represent human behaviour is based on 
the theory of expected utility. Albeit classical in economy, this 
theory neglects individual attitudes and traits. It is based on 
assumptions – such as rational actor and perfect information – 
that are often in contrast with empirical observations of how 
people actually make decisions and behave under uncertainty, 
in particular when dealing with natural resource use (Van den 
Bergh et al. 2000). Thus, alternative theories have been proposed, 
such as bounded rationality, prospect theory, descriptive norm 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Cialdini et al. 1991, Schlüter et al. 
2017). Within agriculture, an early attempt to consider individual 
attitudes in decision-making processes was based on categorizing 
farmers as analytical and intuitive (Öhlmér et al. 1998). Choosing 
different traits (e.g. risk aversion, memory, imitation), different 
categorizations are possible. In the spirit of socio-hydrology 
(Sivapalan et al. 2012, Di Baldassarre et al. 2013, Viglione et al. 
2014), some models of human-agriculture systems have been 
recently proposed (Pande and Savenije 2016, den Besten et al. 
2016, O’Keeffe et al. 2018). These models were based on the 
observed behaviour of smallholders and farmers in India and 
quantified the impact of water use behaviour on crop production 
and farmer livelihoods. In a similar vein, a stylized model for 
smallholders in Kenya was recently developed, incorporating 
perceptions regarding water availability on crop choice and 
water allocation (Kuil et al. 2018).
Water harvesting techniques, such as on-farm ponds, provide 
an alternative to groundwater as a source of water for irrigation. 
On-farm ponds can collect water when it is abundant and be used 
as a source of water for irrigation during dry spells. Their use is 
widespread and promoted in many regions (e.g. Bouldin et al. 
2004, Palanisami et al. 2010, NRAA 2013, Rao et al. 2017, 
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Acheampong et al. 2018). On-farm ponds are often a more 
sustainable source of water than groundwater at least locally. 
They can reduce the water table decline (Sikka et al. 2018) and 
provide a wide range of ecosystem services (Bouldin et al. 2004, 
Moore and Hunt 2012, Céréghino et al. 2014, Omer and Baker 
2019). At the same time, the use of on-farms ponds implies some 
tradeoffs. At the farm level, they require a large initial investment 
by the farmer and reduce the cultivated area. Hence, they imply 
advantages for the whole community, by preserving groundwater 
resources, but not for the single farmer who chooses to build 
a pond. This typical situation arises in the management of com-
mon resources. It falls within the definition of collective action 
problem, namely a situation where individuals face choices “in 
which the maximization of short-term self-interest yields out-
comes leaving all participants worse off than feasible alternatives” 
(Ostrom 1998, p. 1).
There is an increasing interest in the role of collective action 
to improve the effectiveness of natural resource use in rural 
areas (OECD 2013, Zavalloni et al. 2018). Nevertheless, despite 
the big potential to mitigate the effects of dry spells in 
a sustainable way, the use of on-farm ponds has seldom been 
evaluated as a problem of collective action and included in 
socio-agricultural models (van Valkengoed and Steg 2019).
To fill this knowledge gap, we developed a novel agent- 
based model simulating a smallholder farming system, where 
crops, water resources and humans interact under conditions 
of water scarcity and unpredictable rainfall occurrence. 
Supplemental irrigation can be obtained either from the 
underlining aquifer only or via the integration of on-farm 
ponds with groundwater. The farmer’s attitude towards sus-
tainable behaviours is explicitly considered, by categorizing the 
farmer according to their long/short-term orientation. This 
trait corresponds to one of the social dimensions in the 
Hofstede’s cultural dimensions theory (Hofstede 1991, 2011), 
and drives the role of farmers in collective action. We use the 
model to explore under which climatic conditions and in 
which communities the use of on-farm ponds as an additional 
source of irrigation water is beneficial in terms of net economic 
gain and its stability, for the single farmer and the whole 
community.
While the model was maintained as simple as possible to 
ensure general applicability, it was calibrated for the case of the 
Lower Mississippi River Basin (USA). In this region, the water 
table has been declining sharply, mainly due to irrigation with-
drawals (Reba et al. 2017, Yaeger et al. 2018) and the use of 
water from on-farm ponds is encouraged and increasing 
(USDA NRCS 2014, Omer and Baker 2019, Omer et al. 2019).
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 
2 describes the model, from the general idea (Section 2.1) to 
the specific equations (Section 2.2) and their parameterization 
(Section 2.3 and Supplementary Online Material). Section 3 
contains the results of the model simulations along with 
a discussion. Conclusions are presented in Section 4.
2 Methods
2.1 Conceptual model
We developed an agent-based model simulating a smallholder 
farming system (Fig. 1), under conditions of water scarcity and 
unpredictable rainfall. We consider a community of N farmers, 
each managing a farmland of extension Afarm. The farmers in 
the community derive their income from the crop they grow 
on their farm. The crop yield attained every year depends on 
Figure 1. Schematic representation of the system modelled. The farmed land (top) sits on the aquifer A and is divided into patches (squares), each 
representing a farm. The farmers (one for patch) are the agents, making strategic decisions relative to their farm. Farms are of the same size (Afarm), but the 
cultivated area can differ from farm to farm, depending on whether the farmer has invested in an on-farm pond or not. Two farms with contrasting features 
are presented on the right. In farm j, the farmer is short-view oriented (τj < 0:5Þ, hence relies only on groundwater for irrigation and can cultivate the entire 
farm. In farm k, the farmer is long-view oriented (τk > 0.5), hence invested in an on-farm pond (blue square), which occupies a part of the farm, thus reducing 
the cultivated area Ac,k.
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the extension of the cultivated area and on the occurrence of 
crop water stress (i.e. the plant soil water availability during the 
growing season). The inputs to the soil water balance are 
rainfall, represented in the model as a stochastic process, and 
irrigation applications.
Farmers can choose the source of water for irrigation, 
depending on their own attitudes. They can: i) use only 
groundwater, accessing it through a well; or ii) choose to invest 
also in on-farm ponds to store water during the non-growing 
season, when water is abundant. In the latter case, they take 
water from the ponds and resort to groundwater only when the 
pond becomes empty. The on-farm pond reduces the amount 
of cultivated area from Afarm to Ac and requires a large initial 
investment, but lasts longer than a well to access groundwater. 
The pond is assumed to be refilled to capacity every year 
during the non-growing season thanks to rainfall and runoff 
or inputs from superficial waterbodies (Prince Czarnecki et al. 
2016). A well for groundwater extraction is generally cheaper 
than the construction of an on-farm pond, but groundwater 
recharge can be extremely slow, so that the water table can 
deepen over time, to the point that the existing well is no 
longer be able to reach the water table. A deeper well can be 
dug, but its construction requires a new investment of money 
and time. This means that, if the water table becomes too deep 
during the growing season, groundwater cannot be accessed 
for the rest of the season. Moreover, the costs associated with 
well construction increase with depth, so that, eventually, 
a well can become more expensive than a pond.
The farmer’s choice of the source of water for irrigation 
depends on their attitude and on the available economic 
resources. For each farmer i, the attitude is driven by the 
long/short-term orientation of the farmer summarized by the 
parameter τi, ranging from 0 to 1. Values of τi below 
a threshold (here set in the middle of the range, i.e. at 0.5) 
lead farmers to rely only on groundwater (short-view-oriented 
farmers); values above the threshold lead them to invest in 
a more sustainable irrigation source, i.e. the on-farm pond, as 
a complementary source of water (long-view-oriented farm-
ers). Nevertheless, τi (and hence the farmer’s long/short-view 
orientation) can change over time depending on the events 
(here, the attained crop yield in the previous years) and the 
farmer’s (fading) memory of them. If the value of τi crosses 0.5, 
the farmer changes their attitude and hence the source of water 
for irrigation, for example, deciding to invest in an on-farm 
pond when τi becomes greater than 0.5.
We aim to explore how the crop yield and the net economic 
gain, both total and per capita, and the depth of the water table, 
evolve over time depending on the climate conditions and the 
farmers’ attitude.
2.2 Model design
The system, schematically presented in Fig. 1, evolves based on 
the equations in discrete time steps described below. Time is 
represented as a sequence of ticks, which are divided into two 
subgroups: growing season and non-growing season. For sim-
plicity, we assumed that farms are all identical in terms of size 
and pedoclimatic conditions, since the total area is small. All 
the farmers are endowed with the same initial capital and sow 
the same crop.
2.2.1 Growing season
In each farm, crop growth is simulated through a system of 
equations to be interpreted at the daily timescale, coupling the 
temporal evolution of crop biomass, bi, and plant water avail-
ability in the soil, wi (Vico and Porporato 2013). Rainfall R is 
represented as a stochastic process, thus explicitly including its 
variability and unpredictability.
2.2.1.1 Plant water availability. The variable wi represents 
the soil water available to the plants, i.e. the amount of water 
stored within the active rooting depth that can be taken up by 
the crop (volume per unit ground area, i.e. a depth). At each 
time step, the plant available water is determined by the bal-
ance between inputs via precipitation R and irrigation I (if 
any), and losses via evapotranspiration ET and superficial run-
off and deep percolation (Rodriguez-Iturbe et al. 1999): 
wi tð Þ ¼
min w1;wi t   1ð Þ þ R tð Þ þ
Ii t   1ð Þ
Ac;i
  ETi wi t   1ð Þð Þ � Δt
� �
(1) 
where Ac,i represents the cultivated area of the farm and 
Δt represents a time tick in the growing season. While rainfall 
is the same for all the farms, irrigation can change from farm to 
farm, depending on water availability; and different irrigation 
amounts can result in different ET losses. Therefore each farm 
i has its own plant available water wi, irrigation input Ii and 
losses via evapotranspiration, ETi.
To facilitate the exploration of different climate scenarios, 
precipitation R is artificially generated. To this aim, precipita-
tion occurrence is idealized as a marked Poisson process. 
Intervals between two rainfall events are exponentially distrib-
uted, with mean frequency λ (d−1). Event depths are also 
exponentially distributed, with mean α (m).
A demand-based irrigation strategy is considered (Vico and 
Porporato 2011). An irrigation application occurs when plant 
available water decreases below a threshold ~w (intervention 
point). A pre-set level ŵ is restored, provided that there is 
enough available water ai stored in the on-farm pond or 
accessible via the irrigation well, depending on the chosen 
source for water irrigation. The applied irrigation volume in 
the ith farm Ii can be hence written as: 
Ii wi; aið Þ ¼
min ai;Ac;i ŵ   wið Þ
  �




where ai is estimated as per Equations (8)–(10) below.
The evapotranspiration rate depends on several environ-
mental variables and crop features, chiefly air temperature and 
humidity, solar radiation and wind speed, stomatal conduc-
tance, leaf size, and transpiring biomass. The evapotranspira-
tion rate in the ith farm, ETi, is assumed to change during the 
growing season, as a result of the seasonal changes in tempera-
ture and solar radiation, as well as with plant water availability. 
Specifically, ETi is a piecewise-linear function of wi, increasing 
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from zero when no water is available to the plants (wi ¼ 0) to 
a maximum rate of ETmax at w* (Laio et al. 2001). Below this 
value, transpiration rate is reduced as: 
ETi wið Þ ¼
ETmax





where w* is the level of soil plant availability corresponding to 
the incipient stomatal closure and ETmax is the evapotranspira-
tion rate under well-watered conditions (see the 
Supplementary Material, Section S1.2 for details).
Finally, losses via surface runoff and deep percolation are 
assumed to occur instantaneously whenever wi reaches 
a threshold w1 (hence the minimum function in Equation 
(1)). w1 depends on the plant active rooting depth and the 
soil texture. By avoiding the high nonlinearities injected by the 
dependence of the soil hydraulic conductivity on the soil 
volumetric water content (e.g. Campbell 1974), this simplified 
representation of the surface runoff and deep percolation is 
amenable for a solution of Equation (1) with Δt = 1 d, without 
introducing significant numerical errors.
Based on Equation (1), wi ranges between 0, when no water 
is available for plant uptake (i.e. at soil water potentials corre-
sponding to the plant wilting point), and w1. wi can be linked 
to soil saturation level (described in the Supplementary 
Material, Equation (S1)).
2.2.1.2 Crop development and yield. The farm marketable 
yield is determined based on the total crop biomass in the 
farm at the end of the main growing season (i.e. soon after 
flowering for most crops), bi tseasð Þ, as Yi tð Þ ¼ HIbi tseasð Þ, 
where HI is the harvest index (e.g. Hay 1995, Evans and 
Fischer 1999).
In turn, and in line with observations (e.g. Cavero et al. 
2000, Heggenstaller et al. 2009, Feng et al. 2019, Song et al. 
2019), the total crop biomass b in each farm grows exponen-
tially during the main growing season, with rate g, i.e. (Vico 
and Porporato 2013), 
bi tð Þ ¼ bi t   1ð Þ þ gi wi t   1ð Þð Þ � bi t   1ð Þ � Δt (4) 
The function gi represents the relative growth rate. It is 
assumed here that the relative growth rate (and hence final 
yield) can be reduced only by water shortage, i.e. no other 
limitations to crop development are implemented. As such, gi 
depends on soil water availability: when water is scarce, carbon 
fixation is reduced, with negative impacts on plant ability to 
produce new biomass; under severe water scarcity, the total 
biomass can even diminish, since the plants can die. 
A piecewise linear function is assumed to describe the depen-
dence of gi on wi: 
gi wið Þ ¼   βþ
gmaxþβ





where gmax is the maximum relative growth rate (d−1), corre-
sponding to well-watered conditions and β (d−1) is a biomass 
deterioration rate. The threshold w* is the same plant available 
water below which ET decreases, given the close relation 
between plant transpiration and carbon fixation at the leaf 
level.
The cultivated area, Ac,i, does not appear explicitly in the 
definition of the total farm biomass (Equation (4)), but affects 
the initial condition and hence the total biomass and final 
yield. Specifically, bi(1) = B Ac,i, where B is the amount of 
initial crop per unit of surface (kg m−2). B can be interpreted 
as the mass of seeds planted in a square metre.
2.2.1.3 Available irrigation water. The water for irrigation 
can be obtained from an on-farm pond or from the aquifer. If 
the farm has a pond, its water level dP,i evolves during the growing 
season as driven by irrigation withdrawals within the single farm 
in which it is located: 
dP;i tð Þ ¼ dP;i t   1ð Þ  
Ii t   1ð Þ
Afarm   Ac;i
(6) 
where Afarm – Ac,i is the area of the on-farm pond, i.e. the 
complement of the cultivated area Ac,i in the farm. The water 
in the pond could also increase due to runoff collected from 
the fields, rainfall falling directly on the pond, and other off- 
farm surface waterbodies; and decline via evaporation. 
However, these contributions are not considered here. 
Neglecting the within-season recharge via runoff or other sur-
face waterbodies allows focusing on the worst-case and most 
sustainable scenario, where the regional water balance during 
the period of peak water demand remains unaffected by the use 
of on-farm ponds. Furthermore, during the growing season 
rainfall falling directly on the pond and evaporation tend to 
compensate each other (Prince Czarnecki et al. 2016).
Also, the water table depth dA accessible to all farmers 
evolves during the growing season as a result of the water 
withdrawals of all the farmers in the community who use 
groundwater for irrigation, i.e. 






Here A represents the aquifer surface, Ii is the irrigation 
applied by the ith farmer and the index i varies in the set of 
all farmers who are using groundwater at time t. For simplicity, 
no groundwater recharge is included, so that the results below 
represent the worst-case scenario.
Now it is possible to define ai, i.e. the water volume avail-
able for irrigation (Equation (2)), depending on the source of 
water and the features of the available infrastructures. The 
contribution to irrigation from the on-farm pond is: 
aP;i tð Þ ¼
dP;i tð Þ � Afarm   Ac;i
  �




where the second case corresponds to the absence of the on- 
farm pond. Conversely, the potential contribution of 
groundwater: 
aw;i tð Þ ¼
A � dw;i   dA
  �




where dw,i is the maximum depth of the water table accessible via 
the existing pumping infrastructure currently available in the 
farm. If the water table is deeper than the well, the groundwater 
is no longer accessible and therefore unavailable to the farmer. 
Finally, considering that in a farm where there is a pond, water 
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for irrigation is obtained from the pond till the pond is empty 
(dP;i ¼ 0), and from the groundwater after that, while the only 
source of water is the groundwater where there is not a pond, the 
volume available for irrigation, at any time t in the ith farm, 
ai tð Þ; is given by: 
ai tð Þ ¼
aP;i tð Þ if aP;i tð Þ > 0




During the non-growing season, the farmers’ irrigation infra-
structure, economic status, and attitude (i.e. short/long-view 
orientation and memory) are updated depending on the crop 
yield obtained during the previous growing season and the 
status of the infrastructure itself. Depending on the values of 
the attitude parameter τi and the available funds, management 
actions can then be implemented in the farm, thus potentially 
altering the farm infrastructure and initial water availability 
during the subsequent growing season. Note that, in the equa-
tions used in the non-growing season routines, time refers to 
years, i.e. they are to be interpreted at a different timescale 
from that used for the equations relative to the growing season.
2.2.2.1 Irrigation infrastructure. The irrigation infrastruc-
ture can be improved during the non-growing season, pro-
vided the farmer has enough funds to support the associated 
investments. For example, when a pump breaks down or the 
well is no longer deep enough to reach the water table, a farmer 
can replace it with a new one. The depth of new wells is set 
based on the current depth of the aquifer. Moreover, a farmer 
relying only on groundwater can decide to build the on-farm 
pond. Once built, the pond is kept until the end of its lifespan. 
Then, the farmer can decide whether to build it again or to use 
groundwater only for supplemental irrigation, thus recovering 
the entire arable land.
Furthermore, during the non-growing season, on-farm 
ponds, if present, are refilled. For simplicity, we assume that 
the pond is fully recharged during the non-growing season, 
because, in general, the season is long, and it is characterized 
by low losses via evapotranspiration and direct evaporation, so 
that collected runoff and discharge of other surface waterbo-
dies are potentially large.
2.2.2.2 Economy. The ith farmer’s capital, Ei tð Þ, is the net 
result of revenues and expenses: 
Ei tð Þ ¼ Ei t   1ð Þ þ c � Yi tð Þ   Oi tð Þ (11) 
The revenues in a given year depend on the crop price, c, and 
the attained marketable yield Yi tð Þ. In each year, the costs Oi 
are given by the sum of two terms: (i) a fixed cost, which is the 
same for all the farmers and does not depend on the extension 
of cultivated area (e.g. investment and maintenance of tractors 
and other machines); and (ii) the aggregated expenses stem-
ming directly from the cultivation activities (e.g. the cost of 
seeds), and hence dependent on the cultivated area in the farm 
Ac;i. (see Supplementary Material, Section S3.1 for details). 
A further cost is added to these two terms if, after updating 
the attitude parameters and after the farmer’s decision, a new 
well or pond is built. Hence, these additional costs are greater 
than zero only when the water table becomes too deep and 
a new groundwater extraction infrastructure is needed; when 
the pump breaks down and needs a replacement; or when the 
pond is at the end of its lifespan and needs replacement. 
Maintenance costs for pumps and ponds are not considered; 
rather, the model accounts for their functional deterioration 
over time, leading to the need for replacement. In the case of 
the groundwater extraction infrastructure, deterioration 
implies that it can fail and need replacement with 
a probability linearly increasing with its age, independently 
of the water table depth. Conversely, ponds have a finite life-
span (see Supplementary Material, Section S3.1).
2.2.2.3 Farmers’ attitude: short-/long-view orientation and 
memory of previous outcomes. Irrigation choice is driven by 
the farmer’s attitudinal parameter τi, representing their short/ 
long-view orientation: long-view-oriented farmers (τ > 0.5) 
will cooperate to avoid an over-exploitation of the common 
resource by building a pond for supplemental irrigation, while 
short-view oriented farmers (τ ≤ 0.5) will focus only on their 
immediate economic gain, using exclusively groundwater. We 
summarize the initial composition of the whole community as 
the proportion of short-view to long-view-oriented farmers 
(SOF-ratio), i.e. the ratio of farmers initially using only 
groundwater and farmers complementing the groundwater 
extraction infrastructure with on-farm ponds.
For each farmer, the attitude parameter τi is assumed to 
change depending on the events and on how the farmer 
remembers them, according to the following equation: 
τi tð Þ ¼ τ0;i �Mi tð Þ (12) 
Here τ0;i represents the initial value of the farmer’s attitude 
(randomly attributed but respecting the SOF-ratio of the com-
munity simulated) and Mi tð Þ is the memory of the past out-
comes. More specifically, we assume that the farmer 
remembers the ratio between the attained yield in a year 
Yi tð Þ and a desired yield Ŷ . The desired yield Ŷ is assumed to 
correspond to the 80% of the maximum attainable yield, i.e. 
the yield obtained when well-watered conditions can 
be maintained throughout the growing season. This ratio is 
indicative of whether a year has been a good year (Yi tð Þ=Ŷ > 1), 
a neutral year (Yi tð Þ=Ŷ ¼ 1), or a bad one (Yi tð Þ=Ŷ < 1) for the 
farmer. We assume that the memory Mi tð Þ accumulates over 
the years with a decay rate μ ranging between 0 and 1 – another 
attitude parameter of the farmer (Di Baldassarre et al. 2017). 
Hence, the ith farmer’s memory Mi tð Þ evolves in time as: 
Mi tð Þ ¼ μ
Yi tð Þ
Ŷ
þ 1   μð ÞMi t   1ð Þ (13) 
with the initial condition set to Mi 1ð Þ ¼ Yi 1ð ÞŶ . It follows that 
a sequence of neutral years implies that Mi ¼ 1 and thus does 
not change the value of the attitude parameters τi. Conversely, 
sequences where good (bad) years prevail lead to values of Mi 
larger (smaller) than 1 and as such an increase (decrease) of 
both Mi and τi. The rationale is that, under good conditions, 
humans tend to become more long-view-oriented, while nega-
tive conditions lead to more short-view orientations and risk- 
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taking attitudes (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Scholer et al. 
2010, Kahneman 2011). A decay rate μ ¼ 0 corresponds to the 
case of constant farmers’ attitude parameter τi and hence 
constant SOF-ratio in the community. Given the uncertainty 
regarding the parameter μ we consider both the case of con-
stant τi (setting μ ¼ 0) and that in which it evolves 
with μ ¼ 0:2.
Once the attitude parameter τi is defined based on the 
current and previous years, the farmer makes their decision 
on the irrigation system according to the scheme in Fig. 2. 
Depending on the value of the parameter τi, the farmers 
choose their source of water for irrigation: only groundwater 
for τi � 0:5; or, when they are more oriented towards sustain-
able choices (i.e. long-view-oriented; τi > 0:5), on-farm pond 
and groundwater (farm j and k, respectively, in Fig. 1). Note 
that changes in the value of τi result in a change of the farmer’s 
behaviour (and hence the source of water for irrigation) only 
when the value crosses the threshold 0.5. After the decision, 
the farmer’s economy is updated, including any possible 
expense for the construction of an on-farm pond.
2.3 Model parameterization and simulations
While of general applicability, the model is here calibrated for 
the case of the Lower Mississippi River Basin (USA). The 
parameterization is presented and justified in detail in the 
Supplementary Material. In short, we consider corn grown 
over sandy loam, with the main growing season running 
from 25 April to 4 July. A stress-avoidance irrigation is con-
sidered (i.e. ew= w*). Current climate conditions (ETmax, λ and 
α) were determined based on observed meteorological condi-
tions in the region. To explore the effect of future, warmer and 
more extreme climates, we further varied the climatic para-
meters, reducing the total average precipitation by 20% and 
50% and increasing air temperature by 2°C and 4°C (and hence 
ETmax) to define an “intermediate” and “extreme” climate 
scenario, respectively (Table S2). We simulated a community 
of N = 121 farmers, each managing an area Afarm = 3.5 ha. 
Regarding the irrigation infrastructure, all farmers have a well. 
At construction, the depth of a new well exceeds that of the 
water table at that time of a depth ΔdW ¼ 0:75 m. Those that 
also employ an on-farm pond as a source of irrigation water, 
have a pond covering 8% of the farm area, which is comparable 
to the current local guidelines (USDA 1982, Ouyang et al. 
2016) and to the size that would ensure the highest production 
under current climates (Vico et al. 2020). Different community 
composition in terms of initial short- and long-view-oriented 
farmers (i.e. SOF-ratios) are explored.
The model is initialized as follows: At the beginning of each 
growing season, the soil is assumed to be at the point of 
incipient stomatal closure; and the pond, if any, filled to 
capacity (i.e. dP;i = 2 m). We performed 100 simulations for 
each parameter combination. Each simulation lasts 30 years, 
i.e. is based on 30 time series of daily precipitation with para-
meters λ and α. Unless otherwise specified (Fig. 7), the initial 
water table depth was dA ¼ 5 m. In all cases, the initial well 
depth was dW;i ¼ dA þ ΔdW. Each farmer had an initial capital 
equal to twice the cost of building an on-farm pond.
3 Results and discussion
First, we consider the case of constant attitude parameter τi 
(i.e. μ ¼ 0 and hence τi ¼ τ0;i throughout the simulation). We 
show (a) a comparison of yields and net economic gains 
Figure 2. The farmer’s decision-making process for the irrigation source. The farmer’s attitude parameter τi is compared with a threshold: when τi > 0.5, the farmer is 
considered long-view-oriented and aims to rely also on the on-farm pond for irrigation; otherwise, the farmer is considered short-view-oriented and willing to rely only 
on groundwater for irrigation.
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between short vs long-view-oriented farmers belonging to the 
same community, under different climate scenarios (see 
Section 3.1); (b) a comparison of the average net economic 
gain among communities characterized by different propor-
tions of short-view to long-view-oriented farmers (i.e. differing 
in SOF-ratio; Section 3.2). In the latter case, we also explore the 
role of different initial conditions for the water table depth. 
Finally, we consider the case of single farmer’s attitude para-
meter τi evolving in time, as the result of previous experiences 
(i.e. μ> 0), and examine how the community composition and 
the net economic gain are affected by the initial community 
composition under different climates (Section 3.3).
3.1 Role of orientation on single farmers’ outcomes in 
different communities
Figure 3 shows the temporal evolution of the final crop bio-
mass and water table depth of two farmers, belonging to the 
same community but differing in their orientation (short-view 
vs. long-view). The farmer’s orientation does not evolve in 
time. Different communities are considered (panels), from 
one dominated by long-view-oriented farmers (low SOF- 
ratio), to a mixed one (SOF-ratio of 0.5), to two dominated 
by short-viewed farmers (high SOF-ratios).
Farmers relying only on groundwater (i.e. short-view- 
oriented farmers; dashed red lines) achieve higher yields, as 
long as they can access water with their well, because the 
cultivated area is larger. Nevertheless, they experience bad 
years, i.e. years with sharp reductions in yields, when the 
water table becomes too deep to be reached by the existing 
well. Note that even the long-view-oriented farmer experiences 
low-yield years (solid green line) when the water table falls 
below the depth of the well, as the on-farm pond alone does 
not contain enough water to perform a stress-avoidance irri-
gation under dry conditions over the entire growing season. 
However, such yield reductions are generally less sharp than 
for short-view-oriented farmers, because the use of the water 
stored in the pond mitigates water scarcity. Long-oriented 
farmers have hence lower but more stable crop yields and 
economic gains. The frequency of bad years increases with 
the SOF-ratio, as a high SOF-ratio leads to a faster use of the 
groundwater and consequently to a faster decline of the water 
table.
In all communities, the water table declines approximately 
linearly with time (Fig. 3, blue lines), but at a faster rate in 
communities with higher SOF (see Fig. 5 for more detail). 
Also, the average wells become deeper and deeper, to follow 
the decline in the water table (Fig. 3, purple line). While, in 
Figure 3. Temporal evolution of final crop biomass, water table and well depths in a 20-year sample model run, for four communities differing in their SOF-ratio. 
Dashed red lines refer to crop-biomass achieved by a short-view-oriented farmer, solid green lines to that achieved by a long-view-oriented farmer; in blue the depth of 
the water table and in purple the average depth of the wells. For enhanced visibility of the differences across communities and farmers, here the climatic conditions 
correspond to the extreme climate scenario, but similar patterns emerge also for more moderate scenarios. The farmers’ attitude does not evolve in time (i.e. μ ¼ 0).
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principle, each farm could have wells of different depth (the 
result of different pump breakdown times and different 
choices), in most cases a new well is dug in response to 
a decline in water table depth and hence the variability across 
farms is limited.
Figure 4 explores the effect of climatic conditions. There, 
the average net economic gain over 30 years of the long-view 
and short-view-oriented farmers are plotted against the 
community SOF-ratio, for the three climate scenarios, assum-
ing that the single farmer’s attitude does not evolve in time.
For the current and intermediate climates (Fig. 4(a) and (b)), 
short-view-oriented farmers are wealthier than long-view- 
oriented ones, regardless of the community composition. 
Nevertheless, their economic gain is less stable, with the exception 
of the current climate in communities with SOF-ratio smaller than 
0.25. From the point of view of a single farmer, the most profitable 
Figure 4. Average net economic gains over 30 years for long-view-(green solid line) and short-view-(red dashed line) oriented farmers, as a function of the SOF-ratio,  
under three different climate scenarios: a) current, b) intermediate, and c)extreme climate. Shaded areas extend over the average plus and minus the standard 
deviation. The farmers’ attitude does not evolve in time (i.e. μ ¼ 0).
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situation is to be short-viewed in a community with a majority of 
long-view-oriented farmers (i.e. low SOF-ratio). This is a common 
outcome when there is a shared resource to manage (Ostrom et al. 
1999). In contrast, under the extreme climate scenario (Fig. 4(c)), 
being long-view-oriented leads not only to more stable yields (and 
hence economic gains) regardless of the community SOF- 
ratio but also to higher average net economic gains for SOF- 
ratios greater than 0.45.
3.2 Whole community outcomes
Figures 5 and 6 show, respectively, the depth of the water table 
after 10 and 20 years and the average net economic gain over 
a period of 30 years under the different climate scenarios, in 
communities with different (but constant in time) SOF-ratios.
The water table level declines faster in communities 
with a high SOF-ratio, due to the more extensive use of 
Figure 5. Water table depths, averaged over 100 simulations, in communities differing in SOF-ratio after 10 (circles) and 20 (triangles) years, with a starting water table 
depth of 5 m: (a) current climate, (b) intermediate climate and (c) drier climate. The farmers’ attitude does not evolve in time (i.e. μ ¼ 0).
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groundwater across the entire community. This occurs 
under all climate scenarios, but the effect is stronger 
under drier climates, when water consumption for irriga-
tion is larger (Fig. 5).
The average net economic gain increases with SOF-ratio under 
the current climate, as higher SOF-ratios imply fewer on-farm ponds 
and hence a larger cultivated area and consequently higher yields in 
most years (Fig. 6(a), line). Nevertheless, higher SOF-ratios also lead 
to higher variability in net economic gains (Fig. 6(a), shaded area). 
This means that long-view-oriented farmers help the entire commu-
nity towards more stable incomes. However, as seen in the previous 
section (Fig. 4(a)), the long-view-oriented farmers themselves are not 
the wealthiest. The decline of the water table depth causes increas-
ingly frequent bad years with reduced yields. When these losses are 
particularly frequent because the climate is very dry (i.e. in the 
extreme climate) and when they are very common within the 
community because there is a high SOF-ratio, the entire community 
experiences a decline in the average net economic gain. 
Figure 6. Average net economic gain over a period of 30 years in different communities, for the three climate scenarios: (a) current, (b) intermediate and (c) extreme 
climate. The shaded areas extend over the average plus and minus standard deviation for each curve. The farmers’ attitude does not evolve in time (i.e. μ ¼ 0).
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Consequently, under the extreme climate scenario, communities 
with a high SOF-ratio are poorer, and subject to a higher variability 
in net economic gains, than those dominated by long-view-oriented 
farmers, i.e. with low SOF-ratios (Fig. 6(c)). In other words, under 
drier climates, the presence of long-view-oriented farmers contri-
butes not only to more stable but also higher average net economic 
gains for the entire community. Furthermore, under these condi-
tions, even single long-view-oriented farmers can be wealthier than 
short-view-oriented ones (Fig. 4(c)).
Figure 7 explores the role of the initial depth of the water table: 
this parameter affects the net economic gain of the community 
because the building cost of a well increases with the depth of the 
water table (Supplementary Material, Equation (S2)).
The same pattern discussed for the initial depth of 5 m (Fig. 6) 
emerges also for shallower and deeper initial water tables, with the 
only exception being the extreme climate scenario. In this case, for 
high SOF-ratios (>0.7), the initial groundwater depth becomes extre-
mely important, leading to negative incomes for initially already deep 
water tables (Fig. 7(c)). The incomes, which are already reduced due 
to climatic conditions (cf. Fig. 7(a) and (b) with Fig. 7(c)), are not 
sufficient to compensate the costs for irrigation as the water table gets 
deeper. Under these conditions, it is very hard for farmers to get out 
of poverty, at least in the absence of external subsidies.
3.3 Evolution of farmers’ attitudes and effects on their 
net economic gain
We now relax the assumption that the farmer’s attitude does 
not change based on previous experiences and consider 
instead the evolution of the farmers’ attitude parameters τi, 
based on the previous outcomes and the farmers' memory of 
them (μ ¼ 0:2; Fig. 2 and Equations (12)–(13)). Farmers who 
changed their behaviour (i.e. the source of irrigation water) at 
least once during the period considered are here referred to as 
“flexible” farmers. This group includes both initially short- 
view-oriented farmers relying only on groundwater for irriga-
tion (with initial τi < 0.5) who became long-view-oriented 
farmers (i.e. built a pond on their farm); or vice versa.
Figure 8 summarizes the fraction of long-view-oriented, short- 
view-oriented and flexible farmers after 30 years, as a function of the 
initial SOF-ratio of the community. Figure 9 shows the correspond-
ing average net economic gain of the three groups of farmers.
In all the climate scenarios, the fraction of flexible farmers is 
small (Fig. 8). Their net economic gains are on average smaller 
than those of farmers not changing their orientation enough to 
change their irrigation strategies (i.e. farmers whose τ crosses the 
threshold 0.5 during the 30-year period; Fig. 9). In other words, 
changing irrigation strategy has negative effects on the average net 
income. Conversely, the income variability of flexible farmers is in 
between that of long-view-oriented and short-view-oriented 
farmers. The fraction of flexible farmers and their average net 
economic gain increase with increasingly dry climate scenarios.
Furthermore, under drier climates, there is a larger reduction in 
long-view-oriented farmers, than short-view-oriented ones. This is 
the case even though, under this scenario, long-view-oriented farm-
ers who did not change their attitude would have more stable 
incomes and be on average wealthier than short-view-oriented 
ones, at least in communities with a SOF-ratio above a certain 
threshold (see Fig. 4(c)). Hence, the evolution of the farmers’ attitude 
leads to a worsening of their income and its stability. This occurs 
because farmers’ behaviour is modelled here as the one of non- 
rational decision-makers (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Scholer 
et al. 2010, Kahneman 2011, Schill et al. 2019). Farmers thus get 
into what has been described as an experiential lock-in by Payo et al. 
(2016): in response to severe climate conditions, and the associated 
high frequency of bad years and yield reductions, they tend to 
become less long-view oriented (see Section 2.2.2).
4 Conclusions
Dependency on natural resources combined with ecological 
fragility can trigger a vicious circle, where people see their 
Figure 7. Average net economic gain over a period of 30 years within the 
different communities, for different initial depths of the groundwater (from 1 to 
15 m, in steps of 1 m), for (a) current, (b) intermediate and (c) extreme climate 
scenario. The farmers’ attitude does not evolve in time (i.e. μ ¼ 0).
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income reduced due to resource scarcity and, in order to get 
out of poverty, over-exploit their resource, exacerbating the 
situation (Cheng et al. 2019). Moreover, due to this poverty 
trap, persons cannot adopt modern technologies, which could 
help in improving efficiency and minimizing environmental 
impacts.
This risk is large in farming communities operating under 
potential water scarcity and using groundwater for supplemen-
tal irrigation – a common situation in many  regions. On-farm 
ponds can help communities in avoiding such a vicious circle 
but require an attitude towards long-term investments and 
sustainable behaviours. To predict the impact of the water use 
behaviour on crop yields and economic gains in these contexts, 
we developed a socio-agricultural model where farmers, 
depending on their attitudes, can choose between different 
sources of water for irrigation (groundwater, possibly integrated 
with on-farm ponds). In the model, when the water table level 
becomes too deep to be accessible with existing wells, water for 
Figure 8. Proportion of long-view-oriented, short-view-oriented and flexible farmers (i.e. farmers who changed their behaviour at least once during the period 
considered) after 30 years, as a function of the initial SOF-ratio, under the three climate scenarios: (a) current, (b) intermediate and (c) extreme). The memory decay rate 
is μ ¼ 2. The values are averages over 100 simulations.
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irrigation becomes insufficient and reductions in crop yields can 
occur, with negative repercussions on farm income. The fre-
quency and entity of these losses depend on pedoclimatic and 
social factors, and are key factor in determining the most appro-
priate choice of water source for high and stable net economic 
gains, for both the entire community and the single farmers.
The environmental fragility-economic poverty vicious cir-
cle (Cheng et al. 2019) emerged in our results. Four main 
situations can occur and for each of them specific incentives 
can be devised to limit this vicious circle and enhance the 
application of more sustainable approaches to water manage-
ment for irrigation.
(1) Climatic conditions are severe (current climate sce-
nario). In the short term, communities with high SOF- 
ratio are wealthier (Fig. 6(a)), because low yields are not 
very frequent. However, an extensive use of ground-
water leads to a rapid decline of the water table (Fig. 5 
Figure 9. Average net economic gain over a period of 30 years for long-view-oriented farmers (solid green lines), short-view-oriented farmers (dashed red lines) and 
flexible farmers (i.e. farmers who changed their behaviour at least once; dotted yellow lines), under the three climate scenarios: (a) current, (b) intermediate and (c) 
extreme. Shaded areas extend over the average plus and minus the standard deviation of each curve. The memory decay rate is μ ¼ 0:2:.
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(a)), with negative effects on the long-term stability of 
the net economic gain for the entire community and 
the single farmers (Figs. 6(a), 4(a) and 9(a)). Long-view 
-oriented farmers help the community in preventing 
such a rapid decline, but these farmers do not get 
benefits from their sustainable behaviour, except 
a higher stability of the crop yield (Figs. 4(a) and 9 
(a)). In this situation, governments should provide 
incentives to build on-farm ponds.
(2) Climatic conditions are very severe (intermediate cli-
mate scenario). Communities with a given percentage 
of long-view-oriented farmers are wealthier both in the 
short- and medium- to long-term (Fig. 6(b)), because 
long-view-oriented farmers can help in slowing down 
the decline of the water table and, consequently, in 
limiting the frequency of low yields. Again, the farmers 
themselves do not have benefits from being long-term- 
oriented, except a higher stability of the crop yield 
(Figs. 4(b) and 9(b)). Dynamics similar to the so- 
called tragedy of the commons (e.g. Hardin 1968) 
emerge. This is the situation where incentivizing on- 
farm ponds could ensure a more sustainable use of 
resources, as they would immediately provide advan-
tages for the entire community.
(3) Climatic conditions are extreme but groundwater access is 
still affordable (extreme climate scenario). Communities 
with a low SOF-ratio are wealthier in both short- and 
medium-term (Fig. 6(c)). In this case, even for single 
farmers, on-farm ponds are convenient, because yield 
losses are very frequent for all farmers, but are generally 
less sharp for farmers having a pond (Fig. 3). The only 
exceptions are communities with low SOF-ratio (Fig. 4 
(c)). Therefore, incentives are theoretically not necessary. 
Practically, the high frequency of bad years could lead 
farmers to become less long-view-oriented (Fig. 8(c)), 
making incentive necessary, in order to avoid a more 
massive exploitation of the groundwater.
(4) Climate conditions are extreme and groundwater avail-
ability is critical (extreme climatic scenario with deep 
water table). The costs of accessing water become dra-
matically high. This fact, combined with the reduced 
yields due to climatic conditions, can lead to severely 
reduced net economic gains (Fig. 7(c), darker lines). 
Breaking the environmental fragility-economic poverty 
vicious circle becomes hard or impossible. Priority is just 
survival and it may be too late for preventive actions.
These situations have been identified categorizing the farmers 
according to their long/short-view orientation – a crucial trait 
to determine their behaviour in collective action problems. 
Other traits can also play a role and could be considered by 
further extending the agent-based model, e.g. farmers’ age and 
experience, as well as traits that depend on the spatial proxi-
mity between farmers, such as imitation and social influence.
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